Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1060

Port Contention for Fun and Profit

Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley and Sohaib ul Hassan and Cesar Pereida García and Nicola Tuveri

Abstract: Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) architectures are attractive targets for side-channel enabled attackers, with their inherently broader attack surface that exposes more per physical core microarchitecture components than cross-core attacks. In this work, we explore SMT execution engine sharing as a side-channel leakage source. We target ports to stacks of execution units to create a high-resolution timing side-channel due to port contention, inherently stealthy since it does not depend on the memory subsystem like other cache or TLB based attacks. Implementing said channel on Intel Skylake and Kaby Lake architectures featuring Hyper-Threading, we mount and end-to-end attack that recovers a P-384 private key from an OpenSSL-powered TLS server using a small number of repeated TLS handshake attempts. Furthermore, we show that traces targeting shared libraries, static builds, and SGX enclaves are essentially identical, hence our channel has wide target application.

Category / Keywords: implementation / public-key cryptography; applied cryptography; ECDSA; side-channel analysis; timing attacks; OpenSSL; CVE-2018-5407

Date: received 1 Nov 2018

Contact author: nicola tuveri at tut fi

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20181106:170703 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/1060


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]