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Paper 2018/062
Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory
Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee
Abstract
We proposed a zero-contention in cache lines a cache policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in a kernel memory of an embedded system. We suggested that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of TEE to prevent timing side-channel attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- side-channel attack
- Contact author(s)
- humble @ korea ac kr
- History
- 2018-01-18: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/062
- License
-
CC BY
