Paper 2018/062

Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory

Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee

Abstract

We proposed a zero-contention in cache lines a cache policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in a kernel memory of an embedded system. We suggested that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of TEE to prevent timing side-channel attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
side-channel attack
Contact author(s)
humble @ korea ac kr
History
2018-01-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/062
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/062,
      author = {Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee},
      title = {Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/062},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/062}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/062}
}
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