Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/062

Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory

Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee

Abstract: We proposed a zero-contention in cache lines a cache policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in a kernel memory of an embedded system. We suggested that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of TEE to prevent timing side-channel attacks.

Category / Keywords: applications / side-channel attack

Date: received 11 Jan 2018, last revised 16 Jan 2018

Contact author: humble at korea ac kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180118:123343 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/062


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