Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory

Na-Young Ahn; Dong Hoon Lee

Paper 2018/062

Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory

Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee

Abstract

We proposed a zero-contention in cache lines a cache policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in a kernel memory of an embedded system. We suggested that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of TEE to prevent timing side-channel attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Applications
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: side-channel attack
Contact author(s): humble @ korea ac kr
History: 2018-01-18: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/062
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/062,
      author = {Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee},
      title = {Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/062},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/062}
}