Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/006

Higher Order Side-Channel Attacks Resilient S-boxes

Liran Lerman and Stjepan Picek and Nikita Veshchikov and Olivier Markowitch

Abstract: Masking and hiding schemes represent a well-researched and successful option to follow when considering side-channel countermeasures. Still, such measures increase the implementation cost in term of power consumption, clock cycles, and random numbers generation. In fact, the higher the order of protection against side-channel adversaries, the higher the implementation cost of countermeasures. S-boxes represent the most vulnerable part in an implementation when considering side-channel adversary. In this paper, we investigate how to generate S-boxes that have improved resilience against varying orders of side-channel attacks while minimising the implementation costs. We examine whether S-boxes generated against a certain order of attack also represent a good solution when considering different order of attacks. We demonstrate that we successfully generated S-boxes resilient against a certain physical attack order but the improvements are small. As a result, S-boxes that are resilient against first order attacks stay resilient against higher-order attacks, which saves computational power during the design of higher-order side-channel attacks resilient S-boxes.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / S-box construction, Genetic algorithms, Higher-order side-channel analysis, Correlation power analysis

Date: received 1 Jan 2018

Contact author: picek stjepan at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180102:175109 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]