Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/784

Secure Channels and Termination: The Last Word on TLS

Colin Boyd and Britta Hale

Abstract: Secure channels are one of the most pivotal building blocks of cryptography today. Internet connections, secure messaging, protected IoT data, etc., all rely upon the security of the underlying channel. In this work we define channel protocols, as well as security for channels constructed from stateful length-hiding authenticated encryption (stLHAE) schemes. Furthermore, we initiate the concept of secure termination where, upon receipt of a signifying message, a receiver is guaranteed to have received every message that has been sent, and will ever be sent, on the channel. We apply our results to real-world protocols, linking the channel environment to previous analyses of TLS 1.2, and demonstrating that TLS 1.2 achieves secure termination via fatal alerts and close_notify messages, per the specification of the Alert Protocol.

Category / Keywords: Secure channels, stateful length-hiding authenticated encryption (stLHAE), authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD), secure termination, controllable channel protocol, Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Original Publication (with minor differences): Latincrypt, 2017

Date: received 17 Aug 2017, last revised 6 Nov 2017

Contact author: britta hale at ntnu no

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20171106:121905 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/784

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