Paper 2017/691
Universal Forgery and Key Recovery Attacks: Application to FKS, FKD and Keyak
Fanbao Liu and Fengmei Liu
Abstract
In this paper, we provide a security analysis of the Full-State Keyed Sponge (FKS), Full-State Keyed Duplex (FKD) and Keyak, one of the third-round CAESAR candidates, in the classic setting and the quantum model, respectively. In the classic setting, we present an universal forgery attack that can be implemented in $O(2^{c/2})$ queries, where $c$ is the capacity. In the quantum model, by utilizing the Simon's algorithm, we propose an efficient universal forgery attack to FKS, FKD and Keyak with complexity of $O(c)$. Moreover, we also propose an efficient key recovery attack that can be implemented in $O(c)$. Such attacks show that FKS, FKD and Keyak is completely broken in the quantum model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Contact author(s)
- lfbjantie @ 163 com
- History
- 2017-07-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/691
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/691,
author = {Fanbao Liu and Fengmei Liu},
title = {Universal Forgery and Key Recovery Attacks: Application to {FKS}, {FKD} and Keyak},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/691},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/691}
}
