Paper 2017/1134

Machine-Learning Attacks on PolyPUFs, OB-PUFs, RPUFs, LHS-PUFs, and PUF–FSMs

Jeroen Delvaux

Abstract

A physically unclonable function (PUF) is a circuit of which the input–output behavior is designed to be sensitive to the random variations of its manufacturing process. This building block hence facilitates the authentication of any given device in a population of identically laid-out silicon chips, similar to the biometric authentication of a human. The focus and novelty of this work is the development of efficient impersonation attacks on the following five Arbiter PUF–based authentication protocols: (1) the so-called PolyPUF protocol of Konigsmark, Chen, and Wong, as published in the IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems in 2016, (2) the so-called OB-PUF protocol of Gao, Li, Ma, Al-Sarawi, Kavehei, Abbott, and Ranasinghe, as presented at the IEEE conference PerCom 2016, (3) the so-called RPUF protocol of Ye, Hu, and Li, as presented at the IEEE conference AsianHOST 2016, (4) the so-called LHS-PUF protocol of Idriss and Bayoumi, as presented at the IEEE conference RFID-TA 2017, and (5) the so-called PUF–FSM protocol of Gao, Ma, Al-Sarawi, Abbott, and Ranasinghe, as published in the IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems in 2018. The common flaw of all five designs is that the use of lightweight obfuscation logic provides insufficient protection against machine learning attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2019.2891223
Keywords
physically unclonable functionsentity authenticationmachine learning
Contact author(s)
jdelvaux @ ntu edu sg
History
2019-01-09: last of 5 revisions
2017-11-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/1134
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1134,
      author = {Jeroen Delvaux},
      title = {Machine-Learning Attacks on {PolyPUFs}, {OB}-{PUFs}, {RPUFs}, {LHS}-{PUFs}, and {PUF}–{FSMs}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1134},
      year = {2017},
      doi = {10.1109/TIFS.2019.2891223},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1134}
}
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