Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/841

A Methodology for the Characterisation of Leakages in Combinatorial Logic

Guido Bertoni and Marco Martinoli

Abstract: Glitches represent a great danger for hardware implementations of cryptographic schemes. Their intrinsic random nature makes them difficult to tackle and their occurrence threatens side-channel protections. Although countermeasures aiming at structurally solving the problem already exist, they usually require some effort to be applied or introduce non-negligible overhead in the design. Our work addresses the gap between such countermeasures and the naïve implementation of schemes being vulnerable in the presence of glitches. Our contribution is twofold: (1) we expand the mathematical framework proposed by Brzozowski and Ësik (FMSD 2003) by meaningfully adding the notion of information leakage, (2) thanks to which we define a formal methodology for the analysis of vulnerabilities in combinatorial circuits when glitches are taken into account.

Category / Keywords: implementation / side-channel analysis $\cdot$ hardware countermeasures $\cdot$ glitches $\cdot$ formal method

Original Publication (with minor differences): SPACE 2016

Date: received 30 Aug 2016, last revised 29 Sep 2016

Contact author: marco martinoli at bristol ac uk, guido bertoni at st com

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Version: 20160929:102350 (All versions of this report)

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