Paper 2016/841

A Methodology for the Characterisation of Leakages in Combinatorial Logic

Guido Bertoni and Marco Martinoli

Abstract

Glitches represent a great danger for hardware implementations of cryptographic schemes. Their intrinsic random nature makes them difficult to tackle and their occurrence threatens side-channel protections. Although countermeasures aiming at structurally solving the problem already exist, they usually require some effort to be applied or introduce non-negligible overhead in the design. Our work addresses the gap between such countermeasures and the naïve implementation of schemes being vulnerable in the presence of glitches. Our contribution is twofold: (1) we expand the mathematical framework proposed by Brzozowski and Ësik (FMSD 2003) by meaningfully adding the notion of information leakage, (2) thanks to which we define a formal methodology for the analysis of vulnerabilities in combinatorial circuits when glitches are taken into account.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. SPACE 2016
Contact author(s)
marco martinoli @ bristol ac uk
History
2016-09-29: last of 3 revisions
2016-09-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/841
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/841,
      author = {Guido Bertoni and Marco Martinoli},
      title = {A Methodology for the Characterisation of Leakages in Combinatorial Logic},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/841},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/841}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/841}
}
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