Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/607

Protocols for Authenticated Oblivious Transfer

Mehrad Jaberi and Hamid Mala

Abstract: Oblivious transfer (OT) is a basic building block in many cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we exploit some well-known authenticated Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange protocols to build three authenticated 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers. We show that our proposed protocols are secure in the semi-honest model. We also compare our schemes with three similar 1-out-of-2 OT protocols and show that authentication in our schemes costs only up to either two more exponentiations or one message signing, compared to those with no authentication.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / oblivious transfer; OT; secure computation; authentication; key exchange;

Original Publication (with minor differences): 13th International ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, 2016

Date: received 10 Jun 2016

Contact author: mehr j at hotmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160614:172112 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]