Paper 2016/607

Protocols for Authenticated Oblivious Transfer

Mehrad Jaberi and Hamid Mala

Abstract

Oblivious transfer (OT) is a basic building block in many cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we exploit some well-known authenticated Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange protocols to build three authenticated 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers. We show that our proposed protocols are secure in the semi-honest model. We also compare our schemes with three similar 1-out-of-2 OT protocols and show that authentication in our schemes costs only up to either two more exponentiations or one message signing, compared to those with no authentication.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. 13th International ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, 2016
Keywords
oblivious transferOTsecure computationauthenticationkey exchange
Contact author(s)
mehr j @ hotmail com
History
2016-06-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/607
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/607,
      author = {Mehrad Jaberi and Hamid Mala},
      title = {Protocols for Authenticated Oblivious Transfer},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/607},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/607}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/607}
}
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