Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/424

Computational Security of Quantum Encryption

Gorjan Alagic and Anne Broadbent and Bill Fefferman and Tommaso Gagliardoni and Christian Schaffner and Michael St. Jules

Abstract: Quantum-mechanical devices have the potential to transform cryptography. Most research in this area has focused either on the information-theoretic advantages of quantum protocols or on the security of classical cryptographic schemes against quantum attacks. In this work, we initiate the study of another relevant topic: the encryption of quantum data in the computational setting.

In this direction, we establish quantum versions of several fundamental classical results. First, we develop natural definitions for private-key and public-key encryption schemes for quantum data. We then define notions of semantic security and indistinguishability, and, in analogy with the classical work of Goldwasser and Micali, show that these notions are equivalent. Finally, we construct secure quantum encryption schemes from basic primitives. In particular, we show that quantum-secure one-way functions imply IND-CCA1-secure symmetric-key quantum encryption, and that quantum-secure trapdoor one-way permutations imply semantically-secure public-key quantum encryption.

Category / Keywords: foundations / quantum encryption, quantum cryptography, quantum indistinguishability, quantum semantic security

Original Publication (with minor differences): http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.01441

Date: received 29 Apr 2016

Contact author: tommaso at gagliardoni net

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160501:132045 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/424

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