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Paper 2016/396
Cryptanalysis of Haraka
Jérémy Jean
Abstract
In this note, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256 in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about $2^{16}$ function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about $2^{192}$ function evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state that are preserved over several rounds.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Hash FunctionPreimage AttackCollision Attack
- Contact author(s)
- Jeremy Jean @ ssi gouv fr
- History
- 2016-04-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/396
- License
-
CC BY