Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/396

Cryptanalysis of Haraka

Jérémy Jean

Abstract: In this note, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256 in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about $2^{16}$ function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about $2^{192}$ function evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state that are preserved over several rounds.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Hash Function, Preimage Attack, Collision Attack

Date: received 21 Apr 2016

Contact author: Jeremy Jean at ssi gouv fr

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Version: 20160421:205629 (All versions of this report)

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