Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/372

NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion

Mihir Bellare and Georg Fuchsbauer and Alessandra Scafuro

Abstract: Motivated by the subversion of ``trusted'' public parameters in mass-surveillance activities, this paper studies the security of NIZKs in the presence of a maliciously chosen common reference string. We provide definitions for subversion soundness, subversion witness indistinguishability and subversion zero knowledge. We then provide both negative and positive results, showing that certain combinations of goals are unachievable but giving protocols to achieve other combinations.

Category / Keywords: foundations /

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2016

Date: received 12 Apr 2016, last revised 8 Sep 2016

Contact author: mihir at eng ucsd edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160908:171749 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/372