Paper 2016/372
NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion
Mihir Bellare, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Alessandra Scafuro
Abstract
Motivated by the subversion of ``trusted'' public parameters in mass-surveillance activities, this paper studies the security of NIZKs in the presence of a maliciously chosen common reference string. We provide definitions for subversion soundness, subversion witness indistinguishability and subversion zero knowledge. We then provide both negative and positive results, showing that certain combinations of goals are unachievable but giving protocols to achieve other combinations.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2016
- Contact author(s)
- mihir @ eng ucsd edu
- History
- 2016-09-08: last of 3 revisions
- 2016-04-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/372
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/372,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Georg Fuchsbauer and Alessandra Scafuro},
title = {NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/372},
year = {2016},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/372}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/372}
}
