Paper 2016/372

NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion

Mihir Bellare, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Alessandra Scafuro

Abstract

Motivated by the subversion of ``trusted'' public parameters in mass-surveillance activities, this paper studies the security of NIZKs in the presence of a maliciously chosen common reference string. We provide definitions for subversion soundness, subversion witness indistinguishability and subversion zero knowledge. We then provide both negative and positive results, showing that certain combinations of goals are unachievable but giving protocols to achieve other combinations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in Asiacrypt 2016
Contact author(s)
mihir @ eng ucsd edu
History
2016-09-08: last of 3 revisions
2016-04-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/372
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/372,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Georg Fuchsbauer and Alessandra Scafuro},
      title = {NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/372},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/372}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/372}
}
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