Key Extraction from the Primary Side of a Switched-Mode Power Supply

Sami Saab; Andrew Leiserson; Michael Tunstall

Paper 2015/512

Key Extraction from the Primary Side of a Switched-Mode Power Supply

Sami Saab, Andrew Leiserson, and Michael Tunstall

Abstract

In this paper we detail techniques that can be used to analyze and attack an AES implementation on an FPGA from the primary (i.e., external) side of a switched-mode power supply. Our attack only requires measurements of the duty cycle of the power supply, and then increases the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) though averaging, deconvolution and wavelet based detrending. The result is an exploitable source of leakage that allows a secret key to be determined from low-frequency power measurements. The techniques and procedures provide a general approach to performing differential power analysis (DPA) from a single point of information for any single hypothesized intermediate value, suggesting their potential for improving other types of side-channel analysis.

Note: Updated paper based on feedback and new results.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Side-Channel Analysis DPA Switched-Mode Power Supply Deconvolution Detrending Wavelets
Contact author(s): sami saab @ cryptography com
History: 2016-03-17: revised; 2015-05-28: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2015/512
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/512,
      author = {Sami Saab and Andrew Leiserson and Michael Tunstall},
      title = {Key Extraction from the Primary Side of a Switched-Mode Power Supply},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/512},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/512}
}