Paper 2014/784

Weak Instances of PLWE

Kirsten Eisentraeger, Sean Hallgren, and Kristin Lauter

Abstract

In this paper we present a new attack on the polynomial version of the Ring-LWE assumption, for certain carefully chosen number fields. This variant of RLWE, introduced in [BV11] and called the PLWE assumption, is known to be as hard as the RLWE assumption for 2-power cyclotomic number fields, and for cyclotomic number fields in general with a small cost in terms of error growth. For general number fields, we articulate the relevant properties and prove security reductions for number fields with those properties. We then present an attack on PLWE for number fields satisfying certain properties.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.SAC 2014
Keywords
lattice-based cryptographyRing Learning With Errorsattackshardness assumptionssecurity reductions
Contact author(s)
klauter @ microsoft com
History
2014-10-07: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/784
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/784,
      author = {Kirsten Eisentraeger and Sean Hallgren and Kristin Lauter},
      title = {Weak Instances of PLWE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/784},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/784}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/784}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.