Paper 2014/476

Simon's Circuit

Paul Baecher

Abstract

Simon mentions in his seminal result separating collision-resistant hash functions from one-way permutations (EUROCRYPT '98), that the wrong strategy to sample collisions can be exploited to invert the permutation. He, however, does not spell out a concrete circuit that demonstrates this. In this short note, we describe and analyze one such circuit.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
pbaecher @ gmail com
History
2014-06-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/476
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/476,
      author = {Paul Baecher},
      title = {Simon's Circuit},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/476},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/476}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/476}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.