Publicly Auditable Secure Multi-Party Computation

Carsten Baum, Ivan Damgård, and Claudio Orlandi

Abstract

In the last few years the efficiency of secure multi-party computation (MPC) increased in several orders of magnitudes. However, this alone might not be enough if we want MPC protocols to be used in practice. A crucial property that is needed in many applications is that everyone can check that a given (secure) computation was performed correctly -- even in the extreme case where all the parties involved in the computation are corrupted, and even if the party who wants to verify the result was not participating. This is especially relevant in the clients-servers setting, where many clients provide input to a secure computation performed by a few servers. An obvious example of this is electronic voting, but also in many types of auctions one may want independent verification of the result. Traditionally, this is achieved by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs during the computation. A recent trend in MPC protocols is to have a more expensive preprocessing phase followed by a very efficient online phase, e.g., the recent so-called SPDZ protocol by Damgård et al. Applications such as voting and some auctions are perfect use-case for these protocols, as the parties usually know well in advance when the computation will take place, and using those protocols allows us to use only cheap information-theoretic primitives in the actual computation. Unfortunately no protocol of the SPDZ type supports an audit phase. In this paper, we show how to achieve efficient MPC with a public audit. We formalize the concept of publicly auditable secure computation and provide an enhanced version of the SPDZ protocol where, even if all the servers are corrupted, anyone with access to the transcript of the protocol can check that the output is indeed correct. Most importantly, we do so without significantly compromising the performance of SPDZ i.e. our online phase has complexity approximately twice that of SPDZ.

Note: Partial revision of the paper to increase readability.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.9th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks (SCN 2014)
Keywords
Efficient Multi-Party ComputationPublic VerifiabilityElectronic Voting
Contact author(s)
cbaum @ cs au dk
History
2016-09-16: last of 3 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/075

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/075,
author = {Carsten Baum and Ivan Damgård and Claudio Orlandi},
title = {Publicly Auditable Secure Multi-Party Computation},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/075},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/075}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/075}
}

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