Paper 2012/643
Protocols for Multiparty Coin Toss With Dishonest Majority
Amos Beimel, Eran Omri, and Ilan Orlov
Abstract
Coin-tossing protocols are protocols that generate a random bit with uniform distribution. These protocols are used as a building block in many cryptographic protocols. Cleve [STOC 1986] has shown that if at least half of the parties can be malicious, then, in any r-round coin-tossing protocol, the malicious parties can cause a bias of Omega(1/r) to the bit that the honest parties output. However, for more than two decades the best known protocols had bias t/\sqrt{r}, where t is the number of corrupted parties. Recently, in a surprising result, Moran, Naor, and Segev [TCC 2009] have shown that there is an r-round two-party coin-tossing protocol with the optimal bias of O(1/r). We extend Moran et al. results to the multiparty model when less than 2/3 of the parties are malicious. The bias of our protocol is proportional to 1/r and depends on the gap between the number of malicious parties and the number of honest parties in the protocol. Specifically, for a constant number of parties or when the number of malicious parties is somewhat larger than half, we present an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol with optimal bias of O(1/r).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. The short version published in Crypto10, this full and updated version submited for publication to J. of Cryptology
- Keywords
- Fair Coin TossingMultiparty ComputationDishonest MajoritySecure with AbortCheat Detection.
- Contact author(s)
- ilanorlov @ gmail com
- History
- 2012-11-20: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/643
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/643, author = {Amos Beimel and Eran Omri and Ilan Orlov}, title = {Protocols for Multiparty Coin Toss With Dishonest Majority}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/643}, year = {2012}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/643} }