Paper 2010/590

Beyond the Limits of DPA: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks

Andrey Bogdanov and Ilya Kizhvatov


The fundamental problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related information using the lowest possible number of measurements is central to side-channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To address it, this work proposes a novel framework enhancing side-channel collision attacks with divide-and-conquer attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA). An information-theoretical metric is introduced for the evaluation of collision detection efficiency. Improved methods of dimension reduction for side-channel traces are developed based on a statistical model of Euclidean distance. The theoretical and experimental results of this work confirm that DPA-combined collision attacks are superior to both DPA-only and collision-only attacks. The new methods of dimension reduction lead to further complexity improvements. All attacks are treated for the case of AES-128 and are practically validated on a wide-spread 8-bit RISC microcontroller whose architecture is similar to that of many smart cards.

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Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
side-channel attackscombined collision attackslinear collision attacksDPAAES
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andrey bogdanov @ esat kuleuven be
2011-05-11: last of 2 revisions
2010-11-20: received
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      author = {Andrey Bogdanov and Ilya Kizhvatov},
      title = {Beyond the Limits of DPA: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/590},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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