Paper 2008/460

Various Security Analysis of a pfCM-MD Hash Domain Extension and Applications based on the Extension

Donghoon Chang, Seokhie Hong, Jaechul Sung, and Sangjin Lee

Abstract

We propose a new hash domain extension \textit{a prefix-free-Counter-Masking-MD (pfCM-MD)}. And, among security notions for the hash function, we focus on the indifferentiable security notion by which we can check whether the structure of a given hash function has any weakness or not. Next, we consider the security of HMAC, two new prf constructions, NIST SP 800-56A key derivation function, and the randomized hashing in NIST SP 800-106, where all of them are based on the pfCM-MD. Especially, due to the counter of the pfCM-MD, the pfCM-MD are secure against all of generic second-preimage attacks such as Kelsey-Schneier attack \cite{KeSc05} and Elena {\em et al.}' attck \cite{AnBoFoHoKeShZi08}. Our proof technique and most of notations follow those in \cite{BeDaPeAs08,Bellare06,BeCaKr96a}.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Hash Domain ExtensionMACPRFRandomized Hashing
Contact author(s)
pointchang @ gmail com
History
2008-11-02: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/460
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/460,
      author = {Donghoon Chang and Seokhie Hong and Jaechul Sung and Sangjin Lee},
      title = {Various Security Analysis of a pfCM-MD Hash Domain Extension and Applications based on the Extension},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/460},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/460}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/460}
}
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