Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE

Florian Mendel; Martin Schläffer

Paper 2008/109

Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE

Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer

Abstract

LAKE is a family of cryptographic hash functions presented at FSE 2008. It is an iterated hash function and defines two main instances with a 256 bit and 512 bit hash value. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of LAKE. We show how collision attacks, exploiting the non-bijectiveness of the internal compression function of LAKE, can be mounted on reduced variants of LAKE. We show an efficient attack on the 256 bit hash function LAKE-256 reduced to 3 rounds and present an actual colliding message pair. Furthermore, we present a theoretical attack on LAKE-256 reduced to 4 rounds with a complexity of $2^{109}$. By using more sophisticated message modification techniques we expect that the attack can be extended to 5 rounds. However, for the moment our approach does not appear to be applicable to the full LAKE-256 hash function (with all 8 rounds).

Note: Publication Info added.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. The final version of this paper has been published at ACISP 2008.
Keywords: cryptanalysis hash functions collision attack
Contact author(s): martin schlaeffer @ iaik tugraz at
History: 2008-08-14: revised; 2008-03-12: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2008/109
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/109,
      author = {Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer},
      title = {Collisions for Round-Reduced {LAKE}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/109},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/109}
}