Paper 2007/356

A Block Cipher based PRNG Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery

Christophe Petit, Francois-Xavier Standaert, Olivier Pereira, Tal G. Malkin, and Moti Yung


We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom number generator, both in the black box world and in the physical world, separately. We first show that the construction is a secure PRNG in the ideal cipher model. Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the adversary does not increase with the number of physical observations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typically the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor involves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by an exponential factor, making the probability of a successful attack negligible. We believe this work provides a first interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a cryptographic scheme influences its side-channel resistance.

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Publication info
Published elsewhere. To appear in the proceedings of ASIACCS 2008.
physically observable cryptographyside-channel attacksprovable securityblock ciphers
Contact author(s)
fstandae @ uclouvain be
2008-01-02: revised
2007-09-13: received
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      author = {Christophe Petit and Francois-Xavier Standaert and Olivier Pereira and Tal G.  Malkin and Moti Yung},
      title = {A Block Cipher based PRNG Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2007/356},
      year = {2007},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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