Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/379

Security Bounds for the NIST Codebook-based Deterministic Random Bit Generator

Matthew J. Campagna

Abstract: The NIST codebook-based deterministic random bit generators are analyzed in the context of being indistinguishable from random. Upper and lower bounds based on the probability of distinguishing the output are proven. These bounds imply that the security of the designs are bounded by the codebook width, or more precisely on the property that the codebooks act like a random permutation, as opposed to their underlying security parameter or key length. This paper concludes that these designs fail to support security parameters larger than the codebook width.

Category / Keywords: Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Pseudorandom Number Generator, counter-mode

Date: received 1 Nov 2006

Contact author: matthew campagna at pb com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20061103:163011 (All versions of this report)

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