Security Bounds for the NIST Codebook-based Deterministic Random Bit Generator

Matthew J.  Campagna

Paper 2006/379

Security Bounds for the NIST Codebook-based Deterministic Random Bit Generator

Matthew J. Campagna

Abstract

The NIST codebook-based deterministic random bit generators are analyzed in the context of being indistinguishable from random. Upper and lower bounds based on the probability of distinguishing the output are proven. These bounds imply that the security of the designs are bounded by the codebook width, or more precisely on the property that the codebooks act like a random permutation, as opposed to their underlying security parameter or key length. This paper concludes that these designs fail to support security parameters larger than the codebook width.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Deterministic Random Bit Generators Pseudorandom Number Generator counter-mode
Contact author(s): matthew campagna @ pb com
History: 2006-11-03: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2006/379
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/379,
      author = {Matthew J.  Campagna},
      title = {Security Bounds for the {NIST} Codebook-based Deterministic Random Bit Generator},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/379},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/379}
}