Secure Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairing

Benoit Chevallier-Mames; Jean-Sebastien Coron; Noel McCullagh; David Naccache; Michael Scott

Paper 2005/150

Secure Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairing

Benoit Chevallier-Mames, Jean-Sebastien Coron, Noel McCullagh, David Naccache, and Michael Scott

Abstract

In this paper we describe a simple protocol for securely delegating elliptic-curve pairings. A computationally limited device (typically a smart-card) will delegate the computation of the pairing e(A,B) to a more powerful device (for example a PC), in such a way that: 1. the powerful device learns nothing about the points being paired (A and B), nor about the pairing’s result e(A,B), 2. and the limited device is able to detect when the powerful device is cheating. We also describe more efficient variants of our protocol when one of the points or both are already known, and further efficiency gains when constant points are used.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Pairings Smartcards
Contact author(s): noel mccullagh @ computing dcu ie
History: 2005-05-26: last of 2 revisions; 2005-05-26: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2005/150
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/150,
      author = {Benoit Chevallier-Mames and Jean-Sebastien Coron and Noel McCullagh and David Naccache and Michael Scott},
      title = {Secure Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/150},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/150}
}