Paper 2004/110

Designing Against the `Overdefined System of Equations' Attack

Carlisle Adams

Abstract

Recently, Courtois and Pieprzyk proposed an attack on symmetric ciphers that takes advantage of a previously-unexploited property of substitution boxes, or s-boxes, in the round function. This paper gives a brief overview of this ``overdefined system of equations'' attack and shows how the attack may be avoided through the use of round functions that contain a variety of protection mechanisms, including combinations of operators from different algebraic groups, a circular rotation step, and substitution boxes (s-boxes) of large dimension.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
symmetric cipher designcryptanalysissubstitution boxround function
Contact author(s)
cadams @ site uottawa ca
History
2004-05-11: revised
2004-05-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/110
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/110,
      author = {Carlisle Adams},
      title = {Designing Against the `Overdefined System of Equations' Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/110},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/110}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/110}
}
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