Paper 2026/993

Format-Preserving Encryption Creates a Privacy Attack Surface for Re-Identification

Abstract

Format-preserving de-identification methods, for example format- preserving encryption, enable de-identified data to act as an in-place replacement for the original data by retaining syntactic properties. However, when applied to data types with multiple formats, format preservation introduces inherent information-theoretic leakage, as the format itself can reveal non-trivial information about the original data, creating an attack surface that can be realized when appropriate aux- iliary information is available. We formalize format preservation and use Shannon entropy to quantify the resulting leakage. To illustrate the practical impact of this, we document real-world use of format- preserving de-identification on variable-format data types and apply the theory to a real-world dataset. Using personal data from Dan- ish financial institutions, we find that a length and word-preserving transformation has a leakage of 10.12 bits for person names and 3.9 bits for cities, out of a maximum of 17.2 bits. While exploiting this leakage requires appropriate auxiliary information, such information is often readily available in practice. In the worst-case scenario, this can lead to re-identification of some data records; however, even in less extreme cases, it can significantly narrow down the search space for re-identification, e.g. by revealing the length of the original data, or the format of an e-mail domain.