Paper 2026/888

BlindReview: Anonymous and End-to-End Verifiable Peer Review

Xavier Bultel, INSA Centre Val de Loire
Ashley Fraser, Lancaster University
Elizabeth A. Quaglia, Royal Holloway University of London
Abstract

We introduce BlindReview, an anonymous and end-to-end verifiable peer review system that cryptographically guarantees both privacy and auditability throughout the reviewing process. We formally define these security properties and provide rigorous proofs that BlindReview satisfies them. We also present an implementation demonstrating our protocol’s practicality. This work serves as a foundation for verifiable and privacy-preserving peer review, offering a concrete solution to enhance transparency and reduce bias in the academic peer review process.

Note: This is the full version of the paper published at IEEE CSF.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Keywords
Peer reviewprivacyanonymityverifiability
Contact author(s)
xavier bultel @ insa-cvl fr
a fraser5 @ lancaster ac uk
Elizabeth Quaglia @ rhul ac uk
History
2026-05-09: approved
2026-05-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/888
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/888,
      author = {Xavier Bultel and Ashley Fraser and Elizabeth A. Quaglia},
      title = {{BlindReview}: Anonymous and End-to-End Verifiable Peer Review},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/888},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/888}
}
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