Paper 2026/855

Zinc+: SNARKs for Polynomial Rings

Alexander Abdugafarov, Nethermind Research
Albert Garreta, Nethermind Research
Amit Kumar, Nethermind Research
Michał Osadnik, Aalto University
Psi Vesely, Yale University
Ilia Vlasov, Nethermind Research
Kai Zhe Zheng, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nethermind Research
Abstract

Nearly all succinct proof systems express computations as algebraic constraints over a finite field. Operations not native to this field, such as bitwise manipulation, modular arithmetic, and lattice-ring operations, require an arithmetization step that can inflate the witness size by one or more orders of magnitude. We introduce Universal Constraint Systems (UCS) and Zinc$+$. The first is a relation that can express the above constraints with minimal overhead. The second is a framework for building SNARKs for UCS. Concretely, UCS consists of algebraic constraints and ideal membership predicates over multiple polynomial rings simultaneously, such as $\mathbb{F}_q[X], \mathbb{Q}[X], \mathbb{Z}[X]$, etc. Zinc$+$ SNARKs are built from 1) a PIOP for UCS, and 2) a hash-based IOPP for multilinear polynomials over $R=\mathbb{Q}[X]$ or $R=\mathbb{F}_q[X]$. For 1), we provide a general compiler that takes standard finite-field PIOPs and turns them into a PIOP for UCS. The IOPP in 2) depends on $R$: for $R=\mathbb{F}_q[X]$, we construct it via a black-box lift of any existing IOPP for $\mathbb{F}_q$, and for $R=\mathbb{Q}[X]$, we present a novel tensor IOPP design, instantiated with the new code family below. We introduce Integer Pseudo-Reed Solomon (IPRS) codes, a new family of MDS codes over $\mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathbb{Q}[X]$. While not Reed-Solomon codes, these codes have optimal MDS relative minimal distance, support efficient FFT-based encoding, and have bounded norm growth when encoding (unlike a naïve lift of Reed-Solomon codes to the integers). Our unoptimized, open-source, implementation proves 7 SHA-256 compressions followed by the multi-scalar multiplication (MSM) part of an ECDSA verification (the bulk of the work), with the following performance, benchmarked on a MacBook Air M4, without zero-knowledge: Prover time: 40.6 ms, Verifier time: 7.0 ms, Proof size: 198 KB. Zinc$+$ can be instantiated end-to-end or as a lightweight extension to any existing hash-based SNARK over~$\mathbb{F}_q$.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
SNARKIOPIPRS codeshash-based SNARKpolynomial ringsinteger arithmeticECDSAlattice-based cryptographyZinc+Zip+
Contact author(s)
alexander abdugafarov @ nethermind io
albert @ nethermind io
amit kumar @ nethermind io
michal osadnik @ aalto fi
psi vesely @ yale edu
ilia @ nethermind io
kai zheng @ nethermind io
History
2026-05-09: last of 5 revisions
2026-05-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/855
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/855,
      author = {Alexander Abdugafarov and Albert Garreta and Amit Kumar and Michał Osadnik and Psi Vesely and Ilia Vlasov and Kai Zhe Zheng},
      title = {Zinc+: {SNARKs} for Polynomial Rings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/855},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/855}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.