Paper 2026/759

A Scalable Fault Countermeasure for SLH-DSA: Trade-offs Between Memory, Performance, and Fault Resilience

Melissa Azouaoui, NXP (Germany)
Tobias Schneider, NXP (Austria)
Denise Verbakel, NXP (Netherlands)
Abstract

We introduce compressed caching, a scalable and parameterizable countermeasure against grafting tree fault attacks on SLH-DSA. Unlike standard caching, which entails fully caching the WOTS+ signatures and public keys, compressed caching achieves significant memory savings while maintaining strong fault detection capabilities. It can be tuned to achieve a trade-off between caching memory size, fault resilience, and performance, making it well-suited for deployment across devices with varying resource and security constraints. We provide a security and performance analysis of compressed caching and show that it can be configured to achieve high fault detection probability and outperform standard caching, mainly in terms of memory but also in terms of performance. Additionally, we explore granular variants of both standard and compressed caching and study on a finer scale the memory-performance trade-off of both standard and compressed caching. Our results demonstrate that compressed caching is especially advantageous for constrained devices, outperforming standard caching when less than approximately 256 kB of caching memory is available.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Post-Quantum CryptographySLH-DSASPHINCS+Fault Injection AttacksFault Attack Countermeasures
Contact author(s)
melissa azouaoui @ nxp com
tobias schneider @ nxp com
denise verbakel @ nxp com
History
2026-04-21: approved
2026-04-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/759
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/759,
      author = {Melissa Azouaoui and Tobias Schneider and Denise Verbakel},
      title = {A Scalable Fault Countermeasure for {SLH}-{DSA}: Trade-offs Between Memory, Performance, and Fault Resilience},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/759},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/759}
}
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