Paper 2026/747
MDSS-STAR: Private Heavy-Hitters through Multi-Dealer Secret Sharing
Abstract
We propose a new private telemetry system for computing t-heavy hitters in the STAR (Davidson et al., CCS 2022) and POPSTAR (Li et al., USENIX 2024) model. In this setting, each client generates a report with the assistance of a lightweight Randomness Server and submits it to a central Aggregation Server, which can then locally compute only the heavy hitters. As compared to STAR and POPSTAR---which reveal either the full (pseudonymized) frequency histogram or a complex function of it---our protocol reduces leakage: the Aggregation Server learns non-heavy-hitter values only if their frequency exceeds a well-defined threshold. Additionally, while STAR and POPSTAR are insecure in the face of an Aggregation Server that colludes with clients, our protocol provides optimal security against such a colluding server. To achieve these privacy guarantees, our protocol efficiently adapts multi-dealer secret sharing (Eldridge et al., USENIX 2024) to the STAR/POPSTAR model and introduces a novel oblivious secret-share sampling protocol to ensure security against a colluding Aggregation Server. We implement and benchmark the performance of our protocol and find that it is practical for a number of use cases. Moreover, we show that it supports a tunable three-way tradeoff between correctness, efficiency and privacy.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- k-heavy-hitterstelemetrySTAR
- Contact author(s)
-
hme @ cs jhu edu
ahegde3 @ jhu edu
brimhall @ cs jhu edu
gabrielle beck @ lirmm fr
mgreen @ cs jhu edu - History
- 2026-06-02: revised
- 2026-04-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/747
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/747,
author = {Harry Eldridge and Aditya Hegde and Brennon Brimhall and Gabrielle Beck and Matthew Green},
title = {{MDSS}-{STAR}: Private Heavy-Hitters through Multi-Dealer Secret Sharing},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/747},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/747}
}