Paper 2026/700
GRAFHEN is not IND-CPA secure
Abstract
GRAFHEN is a recently proposed noise-free fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on rewriting systems in symmetric groups. We show that GRAFHEN is not IND-CPA secure by constructing a polynomial-time cross-reduction distinguisher whose advantage can be amplified to overwhelming via d! scrambled cross-evaluations. We prove an unconditional information-theoretic lower bound using the near-uniformity of word maps on symmetric groups. We further prove structural barriers to repair: for G= Sn, any semidirect product action compatible with decryption reduces to conjugation, collapsing back to the original attack.
Note: v4: Appendix addressing minor comments. v3: Extended in the NF-oracle model. v2: Revised to address feedback on a preliminary version of the draft.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- fully homomorphic encryptionrewriting systemsymmetric groupnoise-free
- Contact author(s)
- rgerauds @ amazon fr
- History
- 2026-04-29: last of 3 revisions
- 2026-04-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/700
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/700,
author = {Remi Geraud-Stewart},
title = {{GRAFHEN} is not {IND}-{CPA} secure},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/700},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/700}
}