Paper 2026/683

VEIL: Lightweight Zero-Knowledge for Hash-Based Multilinear Proof Systems

Rahul Dalal, Succinct
Tamir Hemo, Succinct
Eugene Rabinovich
Ron Rothblum, Succinct
Abstract

As efficient proof systems mature rapidly, more practical use cases that require zero-knowledge (ZK) guarantees are arising. Adding ZK typically requires either composing the non-zk base system with an expensive zk one that proves correctness of the cryptographic hashes performed by the base verifier, or alternatively making tightly coupled modifications to every component of the base protocol. We introduce VEIL, a lightweight and non-intrusive compiler for hash-based multilinear proof systems. VEIL achieves ZK without these drawbacks. Our approach decouples the protocol's algebraic interactions from the cryptographic hashing and applies a ZK wrapper solely to the algebraic components. This results in a simple, plausibly post-quantum, protocol that achieves a minimal prover overhead of $(1+o(1))$, while maintaining the architectural integrity of the base proof system. Our proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates that, over a $31$-bit base prime field, for a trace of $2^{29}$ field elements, compared to the non-zk proof system, VEIL has a prover overhead of about $3\%$, verifier overhead of $22\%$ and proof-size overhead of $12\%$.

Note: minor technical fixes: clarification in zk-code examples, fix in circuit-eval scheme to make it fully zk instead of statistically zk

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
zero-knowledge
Contact author(s)
rahul @ succinct xyz
tamir @ succinct xyz
eugene @ succinct xyz
ron @ succinct xyz
History
2026-04-13: revised
2026-04-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/683
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/683,
      author = {Rahul Dalal and Tamir Hemo and Eugene Rabinovich and Ron Rothblum},
      title = {{VEIL}: Lightweight Zero-Knowledge for Hash-Based Multilinear Proof Systems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/683},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/683}
}
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