Paper 2026/681
The many faces of Schnorr: a touch-up
, Category LabsAbstract
In a previous paper [Shoup 2023], we presented a modular toolkit for analyzing threshold Schnorr signature schemes, built around "enhanced attack modes" in the non-distributed setting. In this note, we revisit the random oracle analysis of the combination of batch randomness extraction with re-randomized presignatures. We make the simulation argument fully explicit --- in particular, giving a careful analysis of what is leaked through the presignatures, the programmed hash values, and the signature values --- and fill in a gap in the treatment of batch re-randomization. We also give a simpler path to tight security bounds in the combined random oracle plus generic group model (ROM+GGM): rather than reducing to somewhat convoluted (if concrete) assumptions about the hash function within the GGM, we reduce in the ROM to an attack on the Schnorr interactive identification scheme, and then observe that the identification scheme is easily seen to be hard in the GGM.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- digital signatureSchnorr signaturethreshold cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- victor @ shoup net
- History
- 2026-04-08: approved
- 2026-04-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/681
- License
-
CC BY-NC-ND
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/681,
author = {Victor Shoup},
title = {The many faces of Schnorr: a touch-up},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/681},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/681}
}
