Paper 2026/658

Delegate: Coalition Proof Incentivized Outsourced Computation with Smart Contracts

Abstract

In incentivized outsourced computation,an outsourcer hands a computation to multiple contractors, and in return expects the same computation output from each. The state-of-the-art proposals succeed in incentivizing all contractors for honest computation by setting this behavior as the unique Nash equilibrium of the system. Yet, they are either limited to the two-contractor case or the multi-contractor case without security proof against fully collaborating coalitions. Further, employing a smart contract for managing submissions from the contractors has been a non-trivial task due to the copy attack. In this work, we target this issue and propose a smart contract based multi-contractor incentivized outsourced computation protocol Delegate, which is provably secure against coalitions. We further mitigate the copy attack by a universally composable response submission protocol based on commitments, in contrast to previous solutions which only disincentivize it.