Paper 2026/632
A tight security analysis of the FIPS-205 standard (SLH-DSA)
Abstract
The SPHINCS+ framework, recently standardized by NIST as SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), is a leading stateless hash-based signature scheme for the post-quantum era. Concrete-security evaluation of SPHINCS+ faces a trade-off: tight bounds require a conjectural multi-target decisional second-preimage resistance (SM-DSPR), while fully proven bounds incur substantial looseness. In this paper, we refine the concrete security analysis of SPHINCS+ by eliminating this heuristic reliance. In our approach, we analyze the SM-openPRE and SM-PRE properties instead of relying on SM-DSPR. By utilizing a precise probabilistic simulation technique, we restrict the multi-target tightness degradation exclusively to the maximum number of practically revealed targets rather than the total theoretical targets. When applied to the SLH-DSA parameter sets, our conjecture-free approach bridges the theoretical gap, recovering up to 18 bits of classical security and 9 bits of quantum security compared to the NIST loose evaluation. Our results establish a provable bound for the practical security of SLH-DSA without relying on optimistic multi-target assumptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- hash-basedsignatureSPHINCS+
- Contact author(s)
-
dodaichi @ hus edu vn
toannq1977 @ gmail com
phongtrieu53 @ gmail com
danhvuba @ gmail com - History
- 2026-04-04: approved
- 2026-04-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/632
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/632,
author = {Dai Chi Do and Quoc Toan Nguyen and Phong Quang Trieu and Ba Danh Vu},
title = {A tight security analysis of the {FIPS}-205 standard ({SLH}-{DSA})},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/632},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/632}
}