Paper 2026/528
Full Secret Key Recovery of First-order Masked Crystals-Kyber implementation using multiple distinct chosen-ciphertexts
, University of Rennes 1, Valeo, Secure-IC, University of Rennes 1Abstract
Abstract. We present a novel side-channel attack on first-order masked implementations of Crystals-Kyber. It deploys a new distinguisher in the context of post-quantum cryptography. It relies on combining the in formation from several instances of the same distinguisher via multiple ciphertexts decryption requests. The attack has been performed on simu lation and illustrated on the masked implementation of Bronchain et al.. This attack is instantiated in a very noisy environment (Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of 0.67) and provides a success rate of 95% with 75000 traces for full secret key recovery.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. CASCADE 2026
- Keywords
- Crystals-Kybermaskingside-channel attackdistinguisher
- Contact author(s)
-
souhaylsoulami1 @ gmail com
yann connan @ secure-ic com
sylvain duquesne @ univ-rennes fr - History
- 2026-03-19: approved
- 2026-03-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/528
- License
-
CC BY-NC
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/528,
author = {Souhayl Ben El Haj Soulami and Yann Connan and Sylvain Duquesne},
title = {Full Secret Key Recovery of First-order Masked Crystals-Kyber implementation using multiple distinct chosen-ciphertexts},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/528},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/528}
}
