Survey of isogeny-based signature schemes resistant to Castryck–Decru attack

J. S. Bobrysheva; A. S. Zelenetsky; V. V. Davydov

Paper 2026/446

Survey of isogeny-based signature schemes resistant to Castryck–Decru attack

J. S. Bobrysheva

, QApp

A. S. Zelenetsky

, QApp, Bauman Moscow State Technical University

V. V. Davydov

, QApp

Abstract

In 2022, Castryck and Decru introduced an attack that broke several isogeny-based schemes, including SIKE, which had advanced to the final round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Competition. Despite this attack, research on isogeny-based cryptography has continued, primarily due to the compact key sizes offered by these schemes compared to other post-quantum approaches. There are now many isogeny-based schemes that are resistant to the Castryck-Decru attack. These schemes typically involve advanced mathematical structures that may require significant time and effort to study. In this paper, we provide a structured survey of isogeny-based signature schemes that are resistant to the Castryck-Decru attack, aiming to facilitate an understanding of the current landscape and the most practically relevant schemes in this area. We categorize these signature schemes into two main classes: those based on the CSIDH group action and the SQIsign family. For each class, we discuss their fundamental design principles, security assumptions, and specific constructions. We also compare their performance and compactness. Additionally, we describe one representative scheme from each class that is particularly relevant in practice due to its efficiency or compactness. In conclusion, we compare the performance of the schemes discussed in this work with other post-quantum signature schemes.

Note: This is a preprint submitted to the Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques
DOI: 10.1007/s11416-026-00613-4
Keywords: Post-quantum Signature Schemes Isogeny-Based Cryptography SQIsign Family Schemes Castrick-Decru Attack
Contact author(s): jbobrysheva @ qapp tech
azelenetskiy @ qapp tech
vdavydov @ qapp tech
History: 2026-04-08: revised; 2026-03-04: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2026/446
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/446,
      author = {J. S. Bobrysheva and A. S. Zelenetsky and V. V. Davydov},
      title = {Survey of isogeny-based signature schemes resistant to Castryck–Decru attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/446},
      year = {2026},
      doi = {10.1007/s11416-026-00613-4},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/446}
}