Paper 2026/415

Separating Non-Interactive Classical Verification of Quantum Computation from Falsifiable Assumptions

Mohammed Barhoush, University of Montreal
Tomoyuki Morimae, Kyoto University
Ryo Nishimaki, NTT (Japan)
Takashi Yamakawa, NTT (Japan)
Abstract

Mahadev [SIAM J. Comput. 2022] introduced the first protocol for classical verification of quantum computation based on the Learning-with-Errors (LWE) assumption, achieving a 4-message interactive scheme. This breakthrough naturally raised the question of whether fewer messages are possible in the plain model. Despite its importance, this question has remained unresolved. In this work, we prove that there is no quantum black-box reduction of non-interactive classical verification of quantum computation of $\textsf{QMA}$ to any falsifiable assumption. Here, “non-interactive” means that after an instance-independent setup, the protocol consists of a single message. This constitutes a strong negative result given that falsifiable assumptions cover almost all standard assumptions used in cryptography, including LWE. Our separation holds under the existence of a $\textsf{QMA-QCMA}$ gap problem. Essentially, these problems require a slightly stronger assumption than $\textsf{QMA}\neq \textsf{QCMA}$. To support the existence of such problems, we present a construction relative to a quantum unitary oracle.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Quantum CryptographyBlack-Box Separation
Contact author(s)
mohammed barhoush @ umontreal ca
tomoyuki morimae @ yukawa kyoto-u ac jp
ryo nishimaki @ ntt com
takashi yamakawa @ ntt com
History
2026-03-02: approved
2026-02-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/415
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/415,
      author = {Mohammed Barhoush and Tomoyuki Morimae and Ryo Nishimaki and Takashi Yamakawa},
      title = {Separating Non-Interactive Classical Verification of Quantum Computation from Falsifiable Assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/415},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/415}
}
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