Paper 2026/413

On Best-Possible One-Time Programs

Aparna Gupte, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jiahui Liu, Fujitsu Research
Luowen Qian, Northeastern University
Justin Raizes, NTT Research
Bhaskar Roberts, University of California, Berkeley
Mark Zhandry, Stanford University
Abstract

One-time programs (OTPs) aim to let a user evaluate a program on a single input while revealing nothing else. Classical OTPs require hardware assumptions. Quantum measurement offers a possible physical basis for one-time use: obtaining an output may irreversibly disturb the program needed for further computation. Yet deterministic functionalities remain impossible due to gentle-measurement attacks (Broadbent, Gutoski and Stebila, 2013). While recent works achieve positive results for randomized functionalities with high-entropy outputs (Gunn, Movassagh 2025; Gupte, Liu, Raizes, Roberts, Vaikuntanathan 2025), the fundamental limits and the strongest achievable security notions remain poorly understood. Inspired by classical obfuscation, we ask for a “best-possible” one-time compiler: a generic transformation that, for any functionality, leaks the least amount of information compared with any other one-time implementation. We show that a generic best-possible one-time compiler cannot exist even for classical randomized functionalities assuming $\mathsf{SZK} \not\subseteq \mathsf{BQP}$. Given this impossibility, we identify a natural subclass of one-time compilers called “testable one-time program” compilers, which output quantum states augmented with reflection programs for themselves. (1) We formulate a simplified, generalized Single-Effective-Query (SEQ) simulation security notion for quantum channels. The definition uses self-adjoint implementations whose behavior under arbitrary quantum interactions depends only on the channel. We show that SEQ security implies best-possible testable one-time security. (2) We construct SEQ-secure OTPs for all quantum functionalities in the classical oracle model, yielding the first positive results for arbitrary quantum channels beyond classical randomized functionalities. Thus, SEQ security could serve as a testable one-time analogue of virtual black-box (VBB) security in the many-time obfuscation setting. Finally, we propose stateful quantum indistinguishability obfuscation (stateful quantum iO) — quantum state obfuscation for stateful quantum programs. It implies best-possible testable OTPs and is achievable in the classical oracle model, thus giving us a promising approach towards best-possible testable OTPs in the plain model.

Note: 72 pages; preprint. Substantially revised exposition and proofs; strengthened impossibility results and added a separation between SEQ and testable security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
quantum cryptographyone-time programunclonable cryptographystatistical difference
Contact author(s)
agupte @ mit edu
jiahuiliu crypto @ gmail com
l qian @ northeastern edu
jraizes @ andrew cmu edu
bhaskarr @ berkeley edu
mzhandry @ stanford edu
History
2026-10-05: revised
2026-02-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/413
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/413,
      author = {Aparna Gupte and Jiahui Liu and Luowen Qian and Justin Raizes and Bhaskar Roberts and Mark Zhandry},
      title = {On Best-Possible One-Time Programs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/413},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/413}
}
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