Paper 2026/2951
SoK: A Unified Framework for Analyzing Coercion Resistance in Electronic Voting
Abstract
Electronic voting (E-voting) can improve the accessibility and efficiency of elections, but its reliance on electronic systems also introduces security and privacy threats. In remote e-voting, adversaries may observe voters' behavior and obtain some electronic information, making voters more vulnerable to coercion. Hence, coercion resistance is a security property of e-voting protocols which ensures that a voter can deviate from an adversary’s instructions. However, existing e-voting protocols establish coercion resistance under different assumptions about the protocol settings, such as election environments, trust assumptions, and adversarial capabilities. In particular, e-voting protocols involve diverse procedures and interactions, resulting in different protocol syntaxes. Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether their coercion resistance guarantees hold in practical election settings and which protocols provide stronger protection against coercion. In this work, we present a unified framework for systematically analyzing coercion resistance across different e-voting protocols. We introduce a unified syntax for e-voting protocols that captures diverse coercion-resistant protocols. This syntax provides a common execution model in which adversarial capabilities can be specified consistently across different protocols. Using our syntax, we systematically express existing protocols within this framework. We also adapt standard definitions of verifiability and ballot privacy of e-voting protocols to our syntax. Using these definitions, we compare the verifiability and ballot privacy of existing coercion-resistant e-voting protocols. We then extend existing definitions of coercion resistance to our unified e-voting syntax. We systematically classify coercion-resistance settings along five axes: corruption bounds, corruption modes, coercion phases, timing restrictions, and the number of coercion interactions. We establish implication relations among the resulting coercion resistance notions to characterize their relative strength. Using this classification, we evaluate existing e-voting protocols by proving the maximality of coercer-capability settings under which each protocol achieves coercion resistance. Our framework thereby enables direct and fine-grained comparison of coercion-resistant e-voting protocols under our common model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Electronic votingCoercion resistanceClassified coercer capabilitySyntax
- Contact author(s)
-
wonseok @ dgist ac kr
munsanwon2 @ korea ac kr
changminlee @ korea ac kr - History
- 2026-11-22: approved
- 2026-11-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2951
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2951,
author = {Wonseok Choi and Won Kim and Changmin Lee},
title = {{SoK}: A Unified Framework for Analyzing Coercion Resistance in Electronic Voting},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2951},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2951}
}