Paper 2026/2948
LaTSEC: Lattice-Based Threshold Signatures with Native Non-Interactive Identifiable Abort and Compact Per-Party Storage
Abstract
We present $\mathsf{LaTSEC}$, a three-round lattice-based threshold signature scheme with native non-interactive identifiable abort. Each party holds one small-norm signing share and is associated with one public abort key, against which its partial signature is verified directly, without zero-knowledge proofs or an additional interactive protocol. Prior lattice-based threshold signatures that identify misbehaving parties rely on one of three mechanisms: zero-knowledge proofs, an additional interactive protocol, or an everywhere-short secret sharing scheme in which each party holds multiple signing shares, each with its own public abort key. Compared with schemes that use the third mechanism, $\mathsf{LaTSEC}$ substantially reduces per-party storage. The construction uses $\mathsf{SEC}$, a recent ramp everywhere-short secret sharing scheme based on lossless expanders that gives each party a single short share. We prove correctness, identifiable-abort security, and threshold unforgeability under the standard $\mathsf{MLWE}$ and $\mathsf{MSIS}$ assumptions. The unforgeability proof introduces the Repeated-$\boldsymbol{A}$ Matrix Hint-MLWE problem, a new variant of $\mathsf{MLWE}$ with hints that captures the complete tuple of correlated public abort keys. We rigorously prove that this new variant admits a reduction from the standard $\mathsf{MLWE}$ problem. For 60 parties at 128-bit security, $\mathsf{LaTSEC}$ tolerates up to 6 corrupted parties, and, empirically, a randomly chosen set of at least 46 parties can sign with probability at least 0.99. Each party holds one signing share of about 14.3 KiB and is associated with one 24-KiB public abort key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- threshold signatureslattice-based cryptographyidentifiable abortramp secret sharingexpander codes
- Contact author(s)
-
muhammad arzaki @ monash edu
muhammed esgin @ monash edu
markku-juhani saarinen @ tuni fi
amin sakzad @ monash edu
ron steinfeld @ monash edu - History
- 2026-11-22: approved
- 2026-11-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2948
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2948,
author = {Muhammad Arzaki and Muhammed F. Esgin and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen and Amin Sakzad and Ron Steinfeld},
title = {{LaTSEC}: Lattice-Based Threshold Signatures with Native Non-Interactive Identifiable Abort and Compact Per-Party Storage},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2948},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2948}
}