Paper 2026/2946
BOCCHI: Compact Blind SNARK via Malformation-Tolerant Ciphertext Aggregation
Abstract
Blind SNARKs combine fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) with cryptographic proofs to enable verifiable computation over encrypted data, and can substantially outperform SNARK-over-FHE approaches in efficiency. However, ciphertext openings in existing constructions can inflate proofs to tens or hundreds of megabytes. We present BOCCHI, a compact and efficient blind SNARK that addresses this bottleneck by committing to ciphertexts natively and opening them through a few aggregates. To establish soundness even for malformed ciphertexts, we introduce canonical binding and a lightweight noise filter that achieves it with optimal error, tools that may be of independent interest. We further formulate this transformation as a Commit–Aggregate–Check (CAC) compiler and show its effectiveness on two systems with different PIOPs (GKR and Fractal). At $2^{22}$ constraints, BOCCHI produces a 6.57 MB proof in 115.3 seconds, 9.3× smaller and 2.54× faster than Phalanx. Its proof is the smallest among five baselines. Our implementation is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/BOCCHI-Artifacts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- blind SNARKfully homomorphic encryptionverifiable computationproof delegation
- Contact author(s)
-
ye yu @ u nus edu
kexi huang @ u nus edu - History
- 2026-11-22: approved
- 2026-11-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2946
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2946,
author = {Ye Yu and Kexi Huang},
title = {{BOCCHI}: Compact Blind {SNARK} via Malformation-Tolerant Ciphertext Aggregation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2946},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2946}
}