Paper 2026/2914
Recovering HQC Secret Key from Distance Spectrum using Side-Channel Attack
Abstract
HQC is a code-based key encapsulation mechanism selected for standardiza- tion by NIST. It uses sparse secret vectors in a quasi-cyclic structure, where GJS-style attacks can exploit correlations between private syndrome weight and the secret-key distance spectrum. However, HQC decapsulation does not directly manipulate any syndrome, leaving open whether any such attack could be performed in practice. In this work, we present the first practical end-to-end side-channel attack against HQC that recovers the secret key through error-weight leakage and distance-spectrum reconstruction. We identify two sources of leakage in the Reed–Muller decoder under different attacker capabilities. In a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), we exploit the ExpandAndSum function by imposing a zero message, whereas in a known-ciphertext attack (KCA), we target the FindPeaks function without modifying the legitimate encapsulation procedure. We provide a theoretical characterization of the Hadamard coefficients manipulated by FindPeaks, establishing a direct relationship between the highest peak and the error weight under a sufficient decoding condition, while showing that the remaining coefficients also depend on the error pattern. We develop profiled side-channel attacks to estimate the error weight and construct a soft distance spectrum of the secret key. To recover the key from imperfect in- formation, we introduce a simulated-annealing reconstruction algorithm that, in simulations, reduces the number of required error-weight observations by approxi- mately 5.8× compared with the state-of-the-art SSV26 method, with substantially lower reconstruction times. Our experiments on an ARM Cortex-M4 implementation of HQC-1 demonstrate end-to-end secret-key recovery in both attack settings. In the CCA setting, our algorithm achieves a 93.5% success rate with 40 000 decapsulation traces, compared to 200 000 traces for SSV26, and recovers the secret key in all 200 trials with 100 000 traces. Most notably, in the more restrictive KCA setting, our approach recovers the secret key in all 200 trials using 1 000 000 traces, whereas the reconstruction algorithm from SSV26 fails to recover the key in any of the 200 trials, even with 1 300 000 traces.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Post-quantum cryptographyHQCSide-channel attacksReed– Muller decodingError-weight leakageSecret-key recovery
- Contact author(s)
-
magali salom @ inria fr
angelique lopez @ thalesgroup com
valentin vasseur @ thalesgroup com
gabriel zaid @ cryptoexperts com - History
- 2026-11-21: approved
- 2026-11-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2914
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2914,
author = {Magali Salom and Angélique Lopez and Valentin Vasseur and Gabriel Zaid},
title = {Recovering {HQC} Secret Key from Distance Spectrum using Side-Channel Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2914},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2914}
}