Paper 2026/2913
A Collision for 38-Step SHA-256
Abstract
We give a collision for 38-step SHA-256 from the standard initial value, to our knowledge the first. The attack is a two-block differential attack whose message differences are in the same words as in the 38-step semi-free-start collision of Mendel, Nad and Schläffer. Most state words of the second block are fixed in advance. For each first block, a table indexed by the first word of the chaining value supplies the first state words, and one lookup on a 32-bit key matches them with the last free state words so that the characteristic holds through step 17; the remaining steps hold by chance. The expected time is $2^{54.8}$ calls of the 38-step compression function, with $2^{57.5}$ table accesses that this count does not charge. The tables take 7.4 GB, and finding the fixed state words took 52,300 vCPU-hours. A search of 53 GPU-hours found the collision after about 10% of the expected work.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- SHA-256collision attackdifferential cryptanalysisstep-reduced hash functions
- Contact author(s)
- omer goldzweig @ gmail com
- History
- 2026-11-21: approved
- 2026-11-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2913
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2913,
author = {Omer Goldzweig},
title = {A Collision for 38-Step {SHA}-256},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2913},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2913}
}