Paper 2026/2908

From Decoding Leakage to Full Key Recovery: A Single-Trace Attack on FALCON

Merve Karabulut, Florida Atlantic University
Panasayya Yalla, Keysight Technologies
Reza Azarderakhsh
Mehran Mozaffari Kermani
Abstract

FALCON is one of the post-quantum signature schemes selected by NIST. Its compact keys make it attractive for embedded devices, which are exposed to side-channel attacks. Such attacks on FALCON have so far targeted its Gaussian sampler, its floating-point arithmetic, and its number-theoretic transform. We instead attack a step that runs before any of these and has gone unexamined: the routine that decodes the secret key at the start of every signing. We show that this decoding leaks each secret coefficient through two intermediate values it forms. One arises in the decoding itself, the other in the modular conversion that follows. A profiled template attack on these two points recovers each coefficient of the secret polynomials from a single power trace with $98.32\%$ accuracy. Each prediction also carries a confidence score. A single trace does not recover every coefficient, so we add a key-recovery step. It ranks the predictions by confidence and solves the public key relation $g = h\cdot f$ for the rest, using only linear algebra and no lattice reduction. We evaluate the attack on an off-the-shelf ARM Cortex-M4 running FALCON-1024 at its nominal clock. The attack recovers the complete secret key for all 1000 tested keys, requiring 11.04 seconds on average. The decoding routine is shared across FALCON implementations, and the countermeasures proposed for the sampler and the arithmetic do not cover it. It must therefore be protected before FALCON is deployed.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Contact author(s)
mkarabulut2024 @ fau edu
razarderakhsh @ fau edu
History
2026-11-21: approved
2026-11-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2908
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2908,
      author = {Merve Karabulut and Panasayya Yalla and Reza Azarderakhsh and Mehran Mozaffari Kermani},
      title = {From Decoding Leakage to Full Key Recovery: A Single-Trace Attack on {FALCON}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2908},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2908}
}
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