Paper 2026/2896
Four Ciphers in One: Full-Round Attacks on the Reference Implementation of LLBC
Abstract
LLBC is a 128-bit low-latency block cipher for IoT applications, proposed in the IEEE Internet of Things Journal in 2025. The designers release a reference implementation in C and Verilog for reproducibility. The test vectors in the proposal are outputs of this implementation. We show that the reference implementation differs from the specification of the peer-reviewed proposal in eight points. In particular, its round function uses the rotation amounts $(32,16)$ instead of $(3,19)$. We prove that an LLBC-type cipher with rotation amounts $(b_1,b_2)$ is a product of $g/4$ independent ciphers when $g=\gcd(64,b_1,b_2)$ is a multiple of 4. Hence the cipher splits when $g$ is a multiple of 8. As a result, the reference implementation splits into four 32-bit ciphers that never mix. With this split, we attack all 20 rounds. We give a distinguisher with probability 1 from two chosen plaintexts. We decrypt any ciphertext with $2^{32}$ chosen plaintexts. We recover the master key from three known plaintexts with $2^{80}+3\cdot 2^{16}$ encryptions, which is below exhaustive search by a factor of $2^{48}$. The designers estimated that the best attack on the specification reaches nine rounds. On a single PC, our decryption attack on all 20 rounds of the reference implementation took 175.5 seconds. We also study standard techniques. A standard automatic search returns 20-round impossible differentials and zero-correlation approximations. In contrast, the classical differential and linear characteristics and the integral properties that we examined distinguish only 9, 10, and 8 rounds, respectively, inside one part. We also show that the assumption of the usual models, which treat the S-boxes as independent, does not hold for the reference implementation. Finally, we recommend that designers check the released code against test vectors made independently from the specification and check the diffusion of the released code itself before publication.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- LLBCblock cipherreference implementationfull-round attackrotation amountslightweight cryptography
- Contact author(s)
-
7325550 @ ed tus ac jp
yasutaka @ rs tus ac jp - History
- 2026-11-19: approved
- 2026-11-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2896
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2896,
author = {Sei Kofuku and Yasutaka Igarashi},
title = {Four Ciphers in One: Full-Round Attacks on the Reference Implementation of {LLBC}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2896},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2896}
}